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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND
BEYOND: THE FUTURE OF DISPARATE
IMPACT DOCTRINE UNDER TITLE VIII
INTRODUCTION
The disparate impact theory, which allows a plaintiff to make out a
case of discrimination without proving the defendant’s intent to
discriminate,1 has been one of the most controversial and highly
debated areas of antidiscrimination law.2 Despite the criticism it has
received, disparate impact doctrine is almost universally accepted as
an important part of antidiscrimination law.3 Still, disparate impact
doctrine is fraught with inconsistencies and variations that have
proven a source of confusion among courts and scholars, particularly
in the contexts of employment and housing discrimination.
While Supreme Court precedent and the Civil Rights Act of 19914
have given courts ample guidance in addressing disparate impact
claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 5
the law is less settled with respect to cases brought under the Fair
Housing Act,6 also known as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968 (“Title VIII”).7 The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether
Title VIII includes a disparate impact standard, however, all of the
circuit courts to address the issue have answered this question in the
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
702 (2006).
3 Deborah Malamud, Values, Symbols, and Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1668, 1693 (1997).
4 Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(2000)). See Part I.A for further discussion of the 1991 Act.
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
6 Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair
Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 416
(1998) (discussing the inconsistencies in Title VIII jurisprudence).
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006).
1
2
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affirmative.8 Still, these lower courts have failed to reach a consensus
over the proper test to apply when evaluating disparate impact claims
brought under Title VIII. While a number of courts have adopted the
“burden-shifting” test commonly applied in Title VII cases,9 other
courts continue to apply a quasi-constitutional “balancing test”
developed in early Title VIII decisions.10
In addition to this divide over the proper standard, questions have
recently arisen over the relationship between disparate impact
doctrine and the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Specifically, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ricci v.
DeStefano11 raises the possibility that disparate impact doctrine may
directly conflict with equal protection.12 As Ricci suggests, disparate
impact may encourage third parties to engage in race-conscious
decision making. And disparate impact provisions may, themselves,
qualify as “racial classifications,” such that equal protection
jurisprudence would compel a strict scrutiny analysis.13
Therefore, assuming that a constitutional challenge is inevitable,14
courts must construe the disparate impact doctrine in a manner that
comports with equal protection and strict scrutiny analysis. While
courts have utilized disparate impact as both a method of remedying
the social hierarchies that have resulted from past discrimination and
8 Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. and Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243,
1250–51 (10th Cir. 1995); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994);
Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 269 n.20 (1st Cir. 1993); United States
v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1988); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467,
482–84 (9th Cir. 1988); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986); Smith v.
Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d
789, 791–92 (5th Cir. 1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147–48 (3d Cir.
1977); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II), 558 F.2d
1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. City of Black
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974)). See generally John F. Stanton, The Fair Housing
Act and Insurance: An Update and the Question of Disability Discrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 141, 174 (2002) (“[V]irtually every jurisdiction has held that the ‘disparate impact’
discrimination analysis is appropriate in FHA cases.”).
9 See, e.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984); Rizzo, 564 F.2d
126; City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179; Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc.
v. McGlothin 885 N.E.2d 1274, 1280–85 (Ind. 2008).
10 See, e.g., Mountain Side, 56 F.3d 1243, 1252; Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), judgment aff’d in part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Arlington
Heights II, 558 F.2d 1283.
11 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
12 See Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010)
[hereinafter, Primus, Future] (demonstrating that while Ricci was an employment case brought
under Title VII, its implications for disparate impact extend beyond the employment context).
13 See infra Part II.B for a complete discussion of these issues.
14 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2683 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he war between disparate
impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking
about how—and on what terms—to make peace between them.”).
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an “evidentiary dragnet” designed to “smoke out” instances of
intentional discrimination,15 the doctrine is most likely to survive a
constitutional challenge under the latter construction.16 Specifically,
when viewed as a tool for uncovering instances of intentional
discrimination that are often difficult or impossible to prove, disparate
impact may survive strict scrutiny review; the government’s interest
in deterring racial discrimination may be sufficiently compelling to
justify the race-based classifications that disparate impact either
embodies or promotes. 17
Because strict scrutiny also requires that racial classifications be
“narrowly tailored” to serve a compelling government interest,
however, disparate impact must also operate in a manner that directly
serves the government’s interest in remedying hidden intentional
discrimination, without imposing an undue burden on innocent
parties.18 While the concept of “narrow tailoring” remains largely
undefined, this requirement may provide valuable guidance to courts
searching for the proper test to apply in Title VIII cases.
As this Note will illustrate, the “balancing test” formulation of
disparate impact may prevent the doctrine from effectively serving
the government’s interest in preventing intentional discrimination,
such that disparate impact provisions may not satisfy the narrow
tailoring requirement. And because the balancing test often fails to
consider the full extent of a defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests, it may unduly burden defendants who are
undeserving of liability under the evidentiary dragnet view of
disparate impact. Moreover, since the balancing test often measures
the adverse effects of a housing practice based only on the income of
potential applicants, it may lead courts to dismiss cases where a
discriminatory motive is present, as housing providers often rely on
factors other than income when deciding how to allocate housing.19
In contrast to the balancing test, the burden-shifting analysis may
more effectively serve the government’s interests in rooting out
intentional discrimination, as it offers courts the opportunity to
15 See Richard Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 494, 520–21 (2003) [hereinafter, Primus, Round Three] (describing these constructions
of disparate impact doctrine).
16 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1383–84 (arguing that disparate impact is most likely
to serve a compelling interest when interpreted as an evidentiary dragnet).
17 Id. at 1378 (“The compelling interest in remedying hidden intentional discrimination
may justify the existence of disparate impact doctrine . . . .”).
18 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506–08 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (discussing the “narrowly tailored” requirement).
19 See infra Part III(C)(1).
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expose the true motives behind a defendant’s actions. The burdenshifting analysis may also reduce the pressure felt by employers and
housing providers to take race-conscious actions for the sole purpose
of avoiding disparate impact liability, thus reducing one potential
source of constitutional conflict.20 Thus, if disparate impact is to
survive a constitutional challenge within the framework of strict
scrutiny, courts should adopt the burden-shifting test as the proper
framework for Title VIII disparate impact claims. 21
Of course, the different contexts and concerns faced by employers
and housing providers indicate that burden-shifting analysis, as it is
applied in Title VII, may not be an entirely perfect fit for Title VIII
disparate impact claims. Though Title VII provides a proper
framework, several modifications to the test are warranted when
applied in the housing context. Specifically, this Note argues that
because certain justifications carry less weight in the housing context,
Title VIII defendants seeking to justify their practices under the
“business necessity” prong of the burden-shifting analysis must
satisfy a higher standard.
Part I of this Note will illustrate the development and current
application of disparate impact doctrine, and will underscore the lack
of consistency among lower courts over the proper test to apply in
Title VIII cases. Part I will also highlight the two most commonly
applied standards, including the Arlington Heights II “balancing test”
and the Title VII “burden-shifting” test. Part II will identify and
explore an additional source of confusion in disparate impact
doctrine—the possible conflict recognized in Ricci between disparate
impact doctrine and the constitutional principle of equal protection.
Part III will explore how, despite this conflict, disparate impact may
survive a constitutional challenge within the framework of strict
scrutiny, even when construed as an “evidentiary dragnet.” If
disparate impact is to satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirement of strict
scrutiny, however, only the burden-shifting test will achieve this
result. Finally, Part IV will discuss the differences between housing
and employment, and will argue in favor of certain variations on the
burden-shifting test when applied to Title VIII, particularly with
respect to the “business necessity” prong of the analysis. Specifically,
Part IV will argue that while a heightened business necessity standard
akin to constitutional “intermediate scrutiny” may be most
appropriate in cases involving private defendants, a higher
20
21

See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing sources of the constitutional conflict).
See infra Part III.C.2.
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“compelling business necessity” standard is warranted for
government defendants in light of the remedial or regulatory
functions they often perform in the housing industry.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE
A. Foundations in Employment
The Supreme Court first recognized the concept of disparate
impact as a basis for liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (“1964 Act”) in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.22 Although the
words “disparate impact” never appeared in the original version of the
1964 Act, the Griggs Court found that the language of section
703(a)(2), which makes it unlawful for an employer to “limit,
segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s race,”23 demonstrated a congressional intent to prohibit
practices producing a disparate effect on members of certain groups.
Noting that “Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation,”24
the Court held that the Act proscribes not only overt discrimination
but also practices that are “fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation.”25 While this reading of Title VII was once largely
criticized,26 Congress never overruled it. Instead, when Congress
amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,27 it codified Title
VII’s disparate impact standard by placing those words into the
statute, and by addressing the mechanics of a disparate impact
claim.28 As amended, the statute provides:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact
is established under this title only if—

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(2), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2006)) (emphasis added).
24 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
25 Id. at 431.
26 See e.g., George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (1987) (arguing that such a reading was “extremely
strained”).
27 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(2006)).
28 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 507 (citing Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. at
1074).
22
23
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(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact
on the basis of race . . . and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party . . . [identifies an adequate]
alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to
adopt such an alternative employment practice.29
While the Supreme Court once required plaintiffs to carry the
burden of persuasion on the issue of business necessity,30 the 1991
Act affirmatively placed that burden on the defendant.31 Under the
current version of the statute, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case, and must show that the employer’s
practices produce a disparate impact on members of a certain group.
In the employment context, plaintiffs can only satisfy this burden by
showing that three factors are satisfied.32 First, the plaintiff must
identify the specific employment practice that is challenged. Second,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the practice has an adverse impact
on a specific class of persons protected by Title VII. Finally, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant’s practice actually caused the
disparate impact in question, which means the plaintiff “must offer
statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the
[employment] practice in question has caused the exclusion of
applicants . . . because of their membership in a protected group.”33 If
a plaintiff makes this initial showing, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to show that the employment practice has a manifest
relationship to the employment in question.34 If the defendant
successfully proves that the challenged practice serves a business
necessity, the burden of persuasion shifts back to the plaintiff, who
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006).
See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
31 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). For a discussion of the “business
necessity” defense under Title VII, see infra Part IV.A.
32 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (opinion of O’Connor,
J.) (plurality opinion).
33 Id. While the 1991 Act overruled the Supreme Court’s decision to allocate the burden
of persuasion on the issue of business necessity to the plaintiffs, it simply codified the Court’s
articulation of the standards for a prima facie case of disparate impact. George Rutherglen,
Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2316–17 (2006). See also Mahoney, supra note 6, at 457 (noting that
Wards Cove remains good law on points other than its allocation of the burden of persuasion on
business necessity to plaintiffs).
34 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
29
30
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must prove that alternative practices that do not produce the same
racial effect are available and would “serve the employer’s legitimate
interests” just as well.35
B. Disparate Impact under Title VIII: Fact or Fiction?
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 makes it unlawful to
“refuse to sell or rent . . . a dwelling to any person because of race.”36
While this language is recognized as a prohibition on disparate
treatment or intentional racial discrimination,37 the Supreme Court
has never ruled on whether Title VIII’s antidiscrimination provisions
extend beyond actions taken with a discriminatory purpose to
practices that merely produce a discriminatory effect on members of a
protected class.38 However, all of the federal circuit courts to address
the question have allowed disparate impact recovery under Title
VIII.39 While this fact is not determinative of how the Supreme Court
would rule,40 it nonetheless provides support for the proposition. The
following sections will outline how various indicators, including
principles of statutory construction, congressional intent, and
Supreme Court precedent, support the existence of a disparate impact
standard under Title VIII.
1. Principles of Statutory Construction
Many proponents of a Title VIII disparate impact standard
emphasize the statute’s “because of race” language that also appears
in Title VII.41 These proponents reason that because the Supreme
Court has recognized such language as giving rise to a disparate
35

Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (quoting Abemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425

(1975)).
36 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006). While Title VIII also prohibits discrimination on the basis
of “color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin,” id., this Note will focus primarily on
race-based discrimination.
37 While “disparate treatment” and “intentional discrimination” may have once carried
two separate meanings, the terms have become virtually interchangeable. See Primus, Future,
supra note 12, at 1351–52 n.56 (noting that the term “disparate treatment” covers “both formal
differences in the treatment of people of different groups and unlawful employer motives”)
(emphasis added)).
38 Additionally, Title VIII contains no express language referencing a disparate impact
standard. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (codifying disparate impact under Title
VII).
39 See sources cited supra note 8.
40 See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the Court’s decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, 544
U.S. 228 (2005)).
41 See Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. McGlothin 885 N.E.2d
1274, 1282 (Ind. 2008) (“Because Title VII and the FHA use the same language in prohibiting
discrimination, we should apply the same framework to both.”).
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impact claim in the employment context,42 principles of statutory
construction suggest that the “because of race” language used in Title
VIII also gives rise to a claim of disparate impact.43 Until recently,
this argument was tempered by the fact that the same “because of”
language also appears in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”),44 which many lower courts have declined to interpret as
encompassing a disparate impact standard.45 However, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Smith v. City of Jackson has virtually eliminated
this problem.46
In Smith, the Court held that the ADEA does encompass a cause of
action for disparate impact.47 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
relied heavily on principles of statutory construction, particularly the
premise that “when Congress uses the same language in two statutes
having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after
the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text
to have the same meaning in both statutes.”48 After characterizing its
finding of disparate impact under Title VII in Griggs as “precedent of
compelling importance,”49 the Court went on to explain that neither
Title VII nor the ADEA merely prohibit actions that expressly “limit,
segregate, or classify” persons based on race.50 Instead, both

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
See Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 199, 222 (1978) (“[T]hese employment cases suggest that a discriminatory effect
theory should be adopted in appropriate private Title VIII cases as well.”).
44 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)(2006) (”It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual’s age.”) (emphasis added).
45 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 507 n.53 (citing Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc.,
73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir. 1996); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732–
43 (3d. Cir. 1995); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076–78 (7th Cir. 1994)). It
is important to note, however, that these cases were decided after the Court’s decision in Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), where Justice Kennedy noted in a concurring
opinion that “nothing in the Court’s opinion should be read as incorporating in the ADEA
context the so-called ‘disparate impact theory’ of Title VII . . . .” Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Prior to this pronouncement, there had been little doubt among lower courts that
the ADEA did encompass a disparate impact standard. See BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID
D. KADUE, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 416 n.16 (2003) (listing pre-Hazen
Paper decisions from Courts of Appeals recognizing a disparate impact standard under the
ADEA).
46 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
47 Id. at 240.
48 Id. at 233 (quoting Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City Schs., 412 U.S. 427, 428
(1973) (per curiam)).
49 Id. at 234.
50 Id. at 235.
42
43
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prohibitions extend to actions that “otherwise adversely affect [a
person’s] status as an employee.”51
Similarly, the language of Title VIII extends beyond overt acts of
discrimination to reach actions that “otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race.”52 Like Title VII and
the ADEA, this language focuses on the effects of a practice rather
than the actor’s motivation.53 Therefore, the Court’s logic in Smith
should apply with equal force to Title VIII, and the language
similarities between Title VII and Title VIII thus support a conclusion
that Title VIII includes a disparate impact standard.
2. Legislative Purpose
Despite the strong indications that the language similarities
between Title VII and Title VIII support recognition of a disparate
impact under Title VIII, at least one critic has noted that the language
of Title VII “has never been the real source of disparate impact
doctrine.”54 Moreover, the Court itself has even recognized that its
“opinion in Griggs relied primarily on the purposes of the Act,” rather
than on its reading of the statutory text.55 This suggests that
similarities in statutory language may not suffice as the sole basis for
finding a disparate impact standard under Title VIII. Therefore, courts
should also analyze the Congressional motives behind Title VIII to
help determine whether Congress intended to impose a disparate
impact standard.
In its first Title VIII opinion,56 the Court drew from the legislative
history and determined that the Congressional purpose behind Title
VIII was to achieve “truly integrated and balanced living patterns.” 57
Classifying housing integration as a “policy that Congress considered
to be of the highest priority,”58 the Court held that Title VIII should

51 Id. (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988)). The Watson
Court explained that employer actions that produce a disparate impact may be said to “adversely
affect” an individual’s status as an employee. Watson, 487 U.S. at 991.
52 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
53 See Smith, 544 U.S. at 234 (“Congress . . . ‘directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.’” (quoting Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971))).
54 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 506.
55 Smith, 544 U.S. at 235. However, the Court also noted that it later recognized the
Griggs holding as an appropriate reading of the statutory text. Id. (citing Watson, 487 U.S. at
991).
56 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
57 Id. at 211 (quoting 114 C ONG . R EC . 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale)).
58 Id.
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be broadly construed in order to achieve that goal.59 Notably, the
Court based its conclusion on a Title VII decision,60 and many lower
courts since then have followed this lead. In particular, the Second
Circuit in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington61 relied
on the Court’s interpretation of Title VII in Griggs, and held that a
Title VIII violation could be established based solely on disparate
impact.62 According to the Huntington court, it is appropriate to
interpret both statutes in a similar manner because they are “part of a
coordinated scheme of federal civil rights laws enacted to end
discrimination; [and] the Supreme Court has held that both statutes
must be construed expansively to implement that goal.”63 Thus, the
court concluded that achievement of Title VIII’s stated purpose
“requires a discriminatory effect standard; an intent requirement
would strip the statute of all impact on de facto segregation.”64 Under
this reading, the similar goals behind Title VII and Title VIII support
the conclusion that disparate impact is a vital component of Title
VIII’s provisions.
3. The Arlington Heights Ruling
In addition to statutory construction and indicators of legislative
intent, the Supreme Court’s decision in Metropolitan Development
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights I)65 supports
an inference that the Court would recognize a disparate impact cause
of action under the statute if confronted with the issue. In Arlington
Heights, the plaintiffs brought housing discrimination claims under
both Title VIII and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.66 When the Seventh Circuit decided only the equal
protection claim, the Supreme Court reversed, and remanded the case
for consideration of the Title VIII claim as well.67 While the Court
has never expressly ruled on whether Title VIII encompasses a
disparate impact cause of action, critics have inferred that the Court’s
Id. at 212.
Id. at 209 (relying on the holding in Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3d
Cir. 1971)).
61 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d in part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
62 Id. at 935.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 934 (citing John Stick, Comment, Justifying a Discriminatory Effect Under the
Fair Housing Act: A Search for the Proper Standard, 27 UCLA L. REV. 398, 406 (1979)).
65 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
66 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir.
1975).
67 Arlington Heights I, 429 U.S. at 253.
59
60
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remand for of the Title VIII claim indicated the Justice’s belief that a
different analytical framework should apply depending on whether a,
claim is brought under equal protection or under Title VIII.68
C. In Search of a Proper Test: Competing Standards
While it is now almost universally accepted that Title VIII
encompasses a cause of action under disparate impact theory,69 the
proper test to apply in Title VIII cases involving disparate impact
claims remains a major source of confusion. While the abundance of
employment discrimination cases brought pursuant to Title VII has
given courts and scholars ample opportunity to develop some
consistency in that area of law, Title VIII doctrine remains relatively
unexplored, creating substantial confusion with respect to the proper
test for disparate impact doctrine in housing cases.70 Despite the
Supreme Court’s silence on the issue, lower courts have articulated
and applied a variety of standards. Particularly since Title VIII’s
enactment in 1964, courts have drawn from two different and often
conflicting lines of authority—equal protection principals and Title
VII employment discrimination standards.71 From these lines of
authority, the circuit courts have developed and applied two main
tests to disparate impact claims—the balancing test developed in
Arlington Heights II and Huntington, (“the balancing test”) and the
burden-shifting analysis (“the burden-shifting test”) derived from
Title VII’s statutory framework and its associated case law.72
1. The Balancing Test
Relying largely on the constitutional principle of equal protection,
the Eighth Circuit became the first federal court to find liability under
Title VIII based on discriminatory effect alone.73 Several early
68 See Schwemm, supra note 43, at 227 (“Arlington Heights is the strongest hint yet given
by the Court that it would be appropriate to apply a [different] standard . . . in Title VIII
cases.”).
69 For a list of cases following this reasoning, see supra note 8.
70 See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 416 (discussing the lack of the courts’ and scholars’
understanding of the application of disparate impact in fair housing and lending laws).
71 Id. at 425–26 (discussing the development of the authoritative dichotomy).
72 Id. at 434, 437–38.
73 United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974). While at least one
commentator has described Black Jack as employing a balancing test, see Stick, supra note 64,
at 416 (“[T]he Black Jack test incorporated a balancing component . . . .”), it is clear from the
court’s discussion that it in fact conducted a burden-shifting analysis. See Black Jack, 508 F.2d
at 1185 (“Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case . . . the burden shifts to the
governmental defendant to [justify its practice].”).
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decisions that followed the Eighth Circuit’s lead applied a quasiconstitutional “balancing test” to claims of disparate impact under
Title VIII.74 In Arlington Heights II,75 the Seventh Circuit identified
four factors that courts should balance when evaluating a disparate
impact claim: (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s showing of a
discriminatory effect; (2) evidence of discriminatory intent; (3) the
“defendant’s interest in taking the action complained of”; and (4)
whether the “plaintiff seek[s] to compel the defendant to affirmatively
provide housing,” or merely to remove obstacles (such as zoning
restrictions) to private provision of such housing.76
The Second Circuit revisited this test in Huntington Branch,
NAACP v. Town of Huntington.77 While the Huntington court also
applied a “balancing test,” it modified the Arlington Heights II factors
in several important ways.78 For instance, rather than focusing on
“absolute numbers” as evidence of discriminatory impact under the
first factor, the Second Circuit looked instead to the proportion of a
protected class affected by a defendant’s practice.79 The court also
deferred less to the defendant’s interests, requiring that the action
complained of serve a “bona fide and legitimate justification[],” and
that no less restrictive alternatives exist.80 Finally, the Second Circuit
entirely rejected the “intent” factor set forth in Arlington Heights II,
reducing the number of pertinent factors to three.81 The Sixth and
Tenth Circuits have adopted the Huntington approach, balancing only
these three factors.82
2. The Title VII Burden-Shifting Test
Despite the early prevalence of the Arlington Heights II balancing
test for Title VIII claims, many courts have recently shied away from
this approach, looking instead to Title VII for guidance.83
74 See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II),
558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Huntington Branch,
NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 933 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d in part, 488 U.S. 15
(1988).
75 558 F.2d 1283.
76 Id. at 1290.
77 844 F.2d 926.
78 See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 439–40 (discussing the Huntington court’s revisions).
79 Huntington, 844 F.2d at 938.
80 Id. at 939.
81 Id. at 935 (“Practical concerns also militate against inclusion of intent in any disparate
impact analysis.”).
82 Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. and Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243,
1252 (10th Cir. 1995); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986).
83 See, e.g., Mountain Side, 56 F.3d 1243; Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983
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Specifically, these courts have imported the burden-shifting
framework from the employment discrimination decisions.84 The
Third Circuit led the way in this regard with its opinion in Resident
Advisory Board. v. Rizzo,85 where it applied Title VII’s version of the
burden-shifting analysis to a Title VIII disparate impact claim.86 After
analyzing the competing lines of disparate impact precedent, the court
determined that Title VII standards should govern. The Fourth Circuit
followed suit several years later in Betsey v. Turtle Creek
Associates,87 abandoning its prior line of equal protection cases.88
Notably, the court also recognized the difference between private and
governmental defendants in the housing context, a distinction that
will be further explored in Part IV.
More recently, despite the Seventh Circuit’s continued application
of the balancing test, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected that
standard in favor of a burden-shifting framework,89 noting that “most
federal circuits have abandoned the Arlington Heights factors
altogether.”90 In discussing its reasons for choosing the burdenshifting standard, the court pointed to evidentiary concerns. These
concerns and others will be addressed in greater detail in Part III of
this Note. As Part III will illustrate, such issues indicate that if
disparate impact under Title VIII is to survive strict scrutiny in the

(4th Cir. 1984); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977); Villas West II of
Willowridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274, 1280–85 (Ind. 2008).
84 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30, 436 (1971) (analyzing the
plaintiffs’ claims under Title VII).
85 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977). In Rizzo, the City of Philadelphia cancelled construction
of a low-income housing project, and eligible persons sued under a disparate impact theory. The
court found for plaintiffs based on a prima facie case and the absence of any justification by the
city. Id. at 149.
86 Mahoney, supra note 6, at 436. While the Eighth Circuit in Black Jack was the first to
conduct a burden-shifting analysis, it did not employ the same version of the test as courts
addressing Title VII claims. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit required the defendant to justify its
action based on “compelling governmental interest,” a much higher standard than that required
under Title VII. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974).
87 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984).
88 Id. at 987–88 (recognizing the “parallel objectives of Title VII and Title VIII”).
89 Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274,
1282 (Ind. 2008) (noting that while “[f]ederal district courts in the Seventh Circuit are of course
obligated to follow Seventh Circuit precedent, including Arlington Heights II,” state courts “are
not so restricted”).
90 Id. at 1281 (citing Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 419 F.3d 729 (8th
Cir. 2005); Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dept., 352 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2003); Lapid-Laurel,
L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 2002); Langlois v. Abington Hous.
Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 2000); Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d
293 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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event of a constitutional challenge,91 it must formally adopt the
burden-shifting analysis and abandon the balancing test.
II. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS:
A POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT
A. Disparate Impact and Equal Protection
In addition to the confusion among lower courts over the proper
test to apply in Title VIII disparate impact cases, the recent Supreme
Court decision in Ricci v. DeStefano92 has added another variable to
the mix—a potential conflict between disparate impact doctrine and
the equal protection provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.93 In the past four decades, several rounds of legal
questions have arisen regarding the relationship between these two
doctrines.94 In the first round, the main concern of courts and
commentators was whether an equal protection challenge could be
sustained on the basis of discriminatory effects alone.95 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis answered this question in the
negative, holding that an equal protection challenge would only be
sustained upon a showing of discriminatory intent.96 The Court did,
however, empower the legislatures to impose statutory disparate
impact standards.97
The second round of legal questions regarding the relationship
between disparate impact and equal protection involved the source of
authority for statutes prohibiting facially neutral practices that
produce a discriminatory effect.98 Specifically, courts and
commentators struggled with whether such statues were “valid only
as commerce legislation or also as a means of enforcing equal
protection under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”99 While
See infra Part II.
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
93 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person in its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). While not expressly stated, the same provision
has been read into the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government. See Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954). In Sharpe, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the District of Columbia from maintaining
segregated schools, noting that “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government,” than the Fourteenth Amendment imposed
upon the States. Id. at 500.
94 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 494.
95 Id. at 494–95.
96 Id. at 495 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976)).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 495.
91
92
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this series of questions remains largely unresolved,100 a third question
has arisen in recent years—whether, instead of serving as a source of
authority for disparate impact statutes, the Equal Protection clause
may in fact prohibit statutes that impose disparate impact
standards,101 as they may compel the kinds of racial classifications
that equal protection forbids.102
Until recently, this third question was merely academic. In light of
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ricci, however, it appears that
“what was once academic speculation is now judicially actionable.”103
Although Ricci marks the Supreme Court’s first consideration of the
possible conflict between Equal Protection and disparate impact, this
does not mean that such a conflict did not previously exist.104
Moreover, while Ricci involved an employment discrimination claim,
it raises issues that apply to virtually all areas of antidiscrimination
law, such as whether “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among its citizens,”105 or whether the
Constitution is color-conscious, such that “[i]n order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race.”106 In light of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on disparate treatment (absent a
compelling state interest), Ricci also raises questions over when it is
permissible, if ever, to “intentionally discriminate in order to avoid
the unintended discrimination that might otherwise result from
facially neutral policies.”107
B. Ricci v. DeStefano: The Case and Controversy
In Ricci, several firefighters (seventeen whites and one Hispanic)
brought suit against the New Haven, Connecticut, Civil Service
Commission when the Commission refused to certify the results of a

100 Id.
101 Id.

at 495 n.4.
at 495.

102 Id.
103 Primus,

Future, supra note 12, at 1343.
Kenneth L. Marcus, The War Between Disparate Impact and Equal Protection,
2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. (August 26, 2009) at 18, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1462431 (observing that the absence of consideration does not mean that such a conflict did not
previously exist).
105 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
106 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978).
107 Marcus, supra note 104, at 2. While the Court plainly held that such intentional
discrimination was impermissible under the circumstances in Ricci, it left open the possibility
that race-conscious actions may be appropriate in certain instances, such as where an employer
could establish a “strong basis in evidence” that disparate impact liability would result in the
absence of race conscious measures. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
104 See
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promotional exam in the City’s fire department.108 The fire
department administered the exam in order to select candidates for
promotion to fill eight vacant senior positions.109 When the results
were tabulated, the top-ten scores went to white candidates, meaning
that certification of the results would ensure that no black candidates
would receive promotions.110 Seeking to avoid liability for
discrimination under the disparate impact provision of Title VII, the
Commission threw out the results of the test.111 Accordingly, several
white and hispanic firefighters who would have received promotions
had the results been certified brought suit under Title VII and the
Equal Protection Clause, alleging that the Commission had
discriminated against them on the basis of race.112 New Haven argued
in defense that its decision to discard the results was based on a goodfaith belief that if the Commission had certified the results, it would
have been found liable under Title VII’s disparate impact provision,
for adopting a practice with negative impacts on minority
firefighters.113 The Second Circuit agreed, and affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment for the City.114
Reversing the Second Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court held in
favor of the plaintiffs, declaring that New Haven’s ace-based decision
making violates Title VII.115 Justice Kennedy, writing for a fivejustice majority, expressly rejected the city’s argument that racebased actions may be justified by a “good-faith belief” that those
actions are necessary to avoid liability under disparate impact.116
Allowing such a justification would “amount to a de facto quota
system, in which a ‘focus on statistics . . . could put undue pressure
on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures.’”117
Therefore, instead of the proposed “good faith belief” standard, the
Court applied a new “strong basis in evidence,” standard, which,
according to Justice Kennedy, would allow disparate treatment in the
108 Ricci,

129 S. Ct. at 2664, 2670.

109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.

at 2671.
v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the civil service board’s
actions were protected because the board attempted to comply with its Title VII obligations).
115 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
116 Id. at 2675 (“A minimal standard could cause employers to discard the results of lawful
and beneficial promotional examinations even where there is little if any evidence of disparateimpact discrimination.”).
117 Id. (quoting Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (plurality
opinion)).
114 Ricci
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name of avoiding disparate impact under Title VII only when the
defendants could show a “strong basis in evidence” that disparate
impact liability would result.118 Still, Kennedy observed that New
Haven had not satisfied this test, noting “a threshold showing of a
significant statistical disparity and nothing more—is far from a strong
basis in evidence that the City would have been liable” under
disparate impact theory.119 As a result, the Court rejected New
Haven’s arguments that its actions were necessary to avoid disparate
impact liability, and held that New Haven had violated Title VII’s
prohibition on disparate treatment.120
Notably, the Court avoided addressing the constitutional
dilemma,121 “merely postpon[ing] the evil day” when the Court must
decide “[w]hether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact
provisions . . . consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal
protection.”122 By deciding the case upon statutory principles alone,
the Court developed what Richard Primus calls “the Ricci premise,”
framing Title VII’s disparate impact doctrine as the exception to Title
VII’s prohibition on disparate treatment.123 The Court’s analysis
indicates that disparate treatment may be acceptable under Title VII,
particularly in cases where disparate treatment is necessary to avoid
imposing disparate effects on racial groups.124 While this analysis
seems to reconcile disparate impact with disparate treatment by
recognizing a statutory carve-out,125 the question of constitutionality
remains.
While the Court articulated its opinion as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the constitutional implications of Ricci cannot be
ignored. As Primus describes, the Court’s treatment of disparate
impact as the exception to Title VII’s prohibition on disparate
treatment indicates the Court’s recognition of an inherent conflict
between the two doctrines, absent a judicially-created exception.126
118 Id.

at 2675–76 (citing Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)).
at 2678 (citation omitted).
120 Id. at 2681.
121 Id. at 2676 (noting that the Court’s analysis says nothing about equal protection); see
also Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1342 (classifying the Court’s decision against ruling on
the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim as a “gesture of constitutional avoidance”).
122 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
123 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1343.
124 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (holding that an employer may take race-conscious
measures only when there is a “strong basis in evidence” that disparate impact liability will
result if the employer does not take the race-conscious action).
125 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1344.
126 Id. at 1355 (“If administering the disparate impact doctrine would be a disparate
treatment problem but for the statutory carve-out, it is also an equal protection problem.”).
119 Id.
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Moreover, the similarities between the disparate treatment and equal
protection doctrines127 suggest that “[a] conflict between disparate
impact and disparate treatment is also a conflict between disparate
impact and equal protection.”128 While this reading of Ricci appears to
view traditional antidiscrimination law through a virtual looking
glass,129 recent changes in equal protection jurisprudence demonstrate
the increasingly suspect nature of any policy or statute “that places
people in racial categories and measures liability in part by reference
to the allocation of . . . opportunities among those racial groups.”130
Specifically, the Supreme Court’s rulings in City of Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co.,131 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,132 and Gratz v.
Bollinger133 show that equal protection has become less tolerant of
government actions that classify individuals by race and allocate
benefits on that basis, even when such action is intended to remedy
past discrimination.134 Thus, assuming that “the war between
disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or
later . . . it behooves us to begin thinking about how—and on what
terms—to make peace between them.”135 In order to forge this peace,
it may first be necessary to examine the potential sources of
conflict.136

127 See id. at 1363 (explaining that the prevailing view is that Title VII is race conscious
while equal protection is “colorblind”).
128 Id. at 1344.
129 See Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 495 (recognizing that the possibility “that
equal protection might affirmatively prohibit the use of statutory disparate impact standards
departs significantly from settled ways of thinking about antidiscrimination law.” (emphasis
added)).
130 Id. at 496.
131 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a municipal program which
allocated benefits disproportionately to minority subcontractors).
132 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasizing the Fourteenth Amendment’s focus on the
individual, not groups, as the proper unit of analysis).
133 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down an undergraduate affirmative action policy where
race was an overwhelming factor in admissions decisions).
134 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 496.
135 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2683 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1355 (noting that because “Title VII, as a statute, must give
way to the Constitution,” the statutorily-derived exception that saved disparate impact doctrine
from conflict with disparate treatment doctrine will not save disparate impact from a
constitutional challenge, which means that “some other defense” of disparate impact doctrine
must be found).
136 See Marcus, supra note 104, at 10 (separating the conflict into three categories: racial
classification, illicit motives, and racially allocated benefits).
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1. Disparate Impact Encourages Government Actors to
Classify Based on Race
At its most basic level, the Court’s decision in Ricci demonstrates
that disparate impact doctrine may cause employers and housing
providers “driven by compliance concerns to classify their employees
and candidates by race [and allocate benefits on that basis] in order to
avoid the prospect of disparate-impact liability.”137 The constitutional
conflict that arises from this situation is most obvious where the
affected employer or housing provider is itself a government entity, 138
as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that any federal or state
action that classifies individuals based on race is presumptively
unconstitutional.139 Thus, one source of conflict between disparate
impact and equal protection is the untenable position of government
entities seeking to avoid both disparate impact and equal protection
liability.
However, under this formulation, the constitutional conflict
between disparate impact and equal protection becomes virtually nonexistent in cases involving private employers or housing providers,
whose actions are, by definition, outside the reach of equal
protection.140 Under this view, a private employer’s acts of intentional
discrimination, taken for purposes of avoiding violating Title VII, 141
would not give rise to a constitutional cause of action, and a court
could avoid the issue altogether.
However, the conflict between disparate impact and equal
protection may nonetheless extend to cases involving private
defendants, as disparate impact doctrine may itself constitute a “racial
classification.” Under such an analysis, a constitutional conflict
would exist regardless of whether the defendant is a private or
137 Id. at 10–11 (noting that this risk is greatest in cases where it is cheaper for an employer
or housing provider to use racial preferences than to adjust policies which produce the
discriminatory effects complained of); see also SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 4 (3d ed.
2008) (noting that economically rational business owners who “otherwise would be inclined to
minimize unfair practices do not in fact do so because of the costs of controlling prejudiced or
arbitrary agents”).
138 See, e.g., Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (employer was the City of New Haven, Connecticut).
139 Such race-based classifications can only survive if narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling interest. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (state government
action); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (federal government action).
140 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person in its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (emphasis added)).
141 In light of the Ricci premise, such an employer would remain free of any liability if she
could prove, by a strong basis in evidence, that disparate impact liability would result but for the
discriminatory actions.
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governmental entity, as the conflict would stem from Congress’s
impermissible use of race in enacting a statute containing a disparate
impact provision.
2. Disparate Impact Is a Racial Classification in and of Itself
If the existence of a racial classification could be based on
statutory language alone, it would be difficult to argue disparate
impact doctrine is itself a racial classification.142 In contrast to the
affirmative action programs in Adarand and Croson, neither Title VII
nor Title VIII explicitly names particular racial groups.143 However, a
more proper understanding of the concept of express classifications
recognizes that formal statutory language is not determinative as to
whether a statute in fact operates as a racial classification.144 For
example, in 2001, the D.C. Circuit struck down an FCC regulatory
scheme that required broadcast licensees to institute employment
outreach measures, and to report the race and sex of each job
applicant to the FCC.145 Upon determining that the rule placed
“official pressure upon [private] broadcasters to recruit minority
candidates,” the court held that the rule constituted “a race-based
classification that is not narrowly tailored to support a compelling
governmental interest.”146 As Richard Primus observes, this decision
reflects the notion that courts facing a statute that seems
“constitutionally problematic” will often “reason[] backwards” to
determine that some portion of the statute constitutes an express
classification.147
In light of this interpretation of the “express classification”
doctrine, even if disparate impact statutes do not explicitly classify
individuals based on race, courts could nevertheless interpret them as
142 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 508 (“Whether anything [in the language of
Title VII] amounts to an express classification is a difficult question to answer.”).
143 In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the state gave contractors
incentives to hire minority-owned subcontractors and based the status “minority owned” on
racial classifications. In City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality
opinion), the state required that 30% of a contractor's subcontractors be owned by “Blacks,
Spanish -speaking, Orientals, Eskimos, or Aleuts.” Id. at 478.
144 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 509.
145 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass’n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[W]e hold
that [the rule] violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.”).
146 Id. at 15. Like Title VII and Title VIII, the rule never mentioned specific racial groups.
147 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 509. Primus does not suggest that such courts
are acting improperly. Instead, he suggests only that “‘express racial classification’ functions as
a term of art that encompasses a mix of descriptive and normative elements” instead of relying
on formal statutory language. Id.
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express racial classifications that violate equal protection. In light of
Ricci, it has become apparent that disparate impact places the same
“pressure” on third parties to allocate resources based on race as the
FCC regulation in MD Broadcasters. In this respect, courts could
easily conclude that the disparate impact provisions of Title VII and
Title VIII constitute “express racial classifications,” such that a
constitutional conflict exists regardless of the private or governmental
nature of the decision maker in a given case.
III. BEYOND THE LOOKING GLASS:
THE SURVIVAL OF DISPARATE IMPACT
Despite these conflicts between disparate impact and equal
protection, the Court’s decision in Ricci need not signal the death of
disparate impact doctrine. Rather, the two doctrines may be
reconciled, depending on how the courts interpret Ricci and how they
frame disparate impact doctrine in the future.148 Unless the Supreme
Court is willing to completely invalidate disparate impact on
constitutional grounds, it will be forced, sooner rather than later, to
find a compromise between the two doctrines. Regardless of the
ultimate outcome of this debate, the need for such an agreement may
offer valuable guidance for courts and scholars seeking to determine
the most useful test for disparate impact under Title VIII.
A. Disparate Impact and Strict Scrutiny
At its most basic level, the conflict between disparate impact and
equal protection centers on the race-conscious nature of disparate
impact statutes, and the pressure it places on employers and housing
providers to take race-conscious measures that the Constitution would
otherwise prohibit. In this respect, the disparate impact creates racial
classifications (both directly and indirectly) and allocates benefits on
that basis.149 Because equal protection subjects such classifications to
strict scrutiny, it is possible that disparate impact will only survive if
the Court holds that statutory prohibitions on disparate impact satisfy
strict scrutiny review.150
148 See Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1363, 1369. Primus proposes three potential
readings of Ricci, including the “general reading,” the “institutional reading,” and the “visible
victims reading.” Id. at 1362. According to Primus, if either of the latter readings prevail,
disparate impact may be directly reconciled with equal protection. However, under the “general
reading,” equal protection may only be saved by recognition of a compelling government
interest. Id. at 1363.
149 See supra Part II.B.
150 See Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1374–75 (describing methods by which disparate
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While strict scrutiny was once thought to be “strict in theory, but
fatal in fact,”151 the Court disproved of this characterization in Grutter
v. Bollinger152 by upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s
admissions policy. Despite the race-conscious nature of the policy,
the Court found student body diversity to be a compelling state
interest, at least “in the context of higher education,” where inclusion
of different views and backgrounds is crucial to the learning
experience.153
The Grutter decision thus provides strong support for the idea that
certain race-conscious measures are constitutionally permissible, so
long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest. This notion, when coupled with the Ricci premise,154 further
suggests that one way to reconcile disparate impact with equal
protection is to find that disparate impact doctrine serves a
compelling government interest, and is narrowly tailored to achieve
that end.155 Such an approach is consistent with the Court’s analysis
in Ricci, as it would effectively “carve out” disparate impact as the
exception to equal protection’s prohibition on racial classifications,
just as the Court “carved out” an exception to the disparate treatment
doctrine. Thus, even if Ricci is interpreted as recognizing a direct
conflict between disparate impact and equal protection,156 disparate
impact may still survive if such an interest exists.157

impact can survive a strict scrutiny analysis based on equal protection). However, Primus
suggests that this proposition should only apply if the “general reading” of Ricci prevails. If an
alternate reading prevails, however, disparate impact may not need to satisfy strict scrutiny in
order to survive a constitutional challenge. Id.
151 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980)).
152 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative
action admissions policy as narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest).
153 Id. at 328.
154 The “Ricci premise” recognizes that disparate impact doctrine operates as an exception
to the disparate treatment doctrine, thus saving disparate impact doctrine from a potential
conflict with Title VII’s prohibition on disparate treatment. See Primus, Future, supra note 12,
at 1384.
155 See id. at 1375 (proposing that the equal protection problem may be “parried by
showing that the doctrine is narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest”).
156 This is what Primus describes as the “general reading” of Ricci. Primus, Future, supra
note 12, at 1363. Under the “general reading” of Ricci, disparate impact doctrine conflicts with
equal protection by forcing racial classifications and allocation of benefits based on group
membership, which equal protection forbids. Primus also proposes two alternative readings of
Ricci. Id. at 1364–74. Under the “institutional reading,” and the “visible victims reading,”
disparate impact and equal protection would not conflict, even absent a compelling government
interest. Id. at 1374–75.
157 Id. at 1384–85 (Title VII’s prohibition on practices that produce a disparate impact will
be constitutional if the Court concludes that they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
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B. Compelling Government Interests
If disparate impact is to survive within a strict scrutiny framework,
questions arise over what compelling interests, if any, may justify a
government measure designed to force certain racial classifications.
While the Court has recognized that promotion of diversity may be a
compelling state interest,158 it has not recognized this interest outside
the context of higher education. Moreover, because the admissions
policy upheld in Grutter considered “a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin
[was] but a single though important element,”159 the Court might be
less likely to recognize “an interest in simple ethnic diversity.”160
However, several authors have suggested that Grutter’s emphasis on
society’s need for citizens familiar with a wide variety of diverse
viewpoints may be transferred outside the higher education context.161
One commentator has also suggested that the Grutter rationale may
apply in a residential context as well.162 Still, whether courts will
extend Grutter beyond the college admissions context remains
unclear,163 and even under such an extension, race could not be the
only consideration.164
In the event that a government’s interest in diversity cannot justify
disparate impact, it may be able to advance two alternative
compelling interests.165 These include an interest in ferreting out
instances of intentional discrimination (the “evidentiary interest”),

government interest).
158 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)
(“The freedom of a [state] university to make its own judgments as to education includes the
selection of its student body.”).
159 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315).
160 Id. at 324 (quoting Bakke, 539 U.S. at 315).
161 See Adam Gordon, Making Exclusionary Zoning Remedies Work: How Courts
Applying Title VII Standards to Fair Housing Cases Have Misunderstood the Housing Market,
24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 437, 463 (2006) (citing Cynthia E. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work:
Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 1 (2005)) (considering how Grutter might apply beyond the academic context); Eric A.
Tilles, Lessons from Bakke: The Effect of Grutter on Affirmative Action in Employment, 6 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 451 (2004) (discussing Grutter’s effects on affirmative action); Jessica
Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at Work: A Title VII Critique of Constitutional Affirmative Action,
115 YALE L. J. 1408 (2006) (using Title VII to evaluate Grutter).
162 Gordon, supra note 161, at 463 (citing Josh Whitehead, Using Disparate Impact
Analysis to Strike Down Exclusionary Zoning Codes, 33 REAL EST. L. J. 359, 395 (2005)).
163 Id.
164 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336–37 (holding that universities may consider race as one of
many factors when making admissions decisions, but that it may not be the exclusive factor).
165 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1368–75.
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and an interest in complying with federal antidiscrimination statutes,
including Title VII and Title VIII (the “compliance interest”).166
While the compliance interest may only be useful in defending the
race-conscious actions taken by governmental entities in an effort to
avoid disparate impact liability, the evidentiary interest may be
sufficient to save disparate impact doctrine as a whole from
constitutional invalidation.167
However, if disparate impact is to be justified by this evidentiary
interest, it must be narrowly construed. At least one critic has argued
that disparate impact is only compatible with equal protection when it
is construed as a means of rooting out instances of intentional
discrimination.168 Therefore, while disparate impact has been
construed as both an evidentiary tool designed to “root out”
intentional discrimination and a mechanism to remedy the effects of
past discrimination,169 the doctrine is most likely to be justified by a
compelling government interest when viewed as an “evidentiary
dragnet.”170 While the Supreme Court has already rejected the notion
that redressing general trends of past discrimination could serve as a
compelling government interest,171 the government’s interest in
preventing intentional discrimination “seems compelling as a
consensus matter.”172 As Richard Primus observed pre-Ricci,
“[a]dopting an [evidentiary dragnet] interpretation . . . would help
preserve disparate impact doctrine against an equal protection attack
by making it conform to the presentist, individualist approach that
increasingly typifies equal protection itself.”173
The evidentiary dragnet view of disparate impact, while less
ambitious than views that treat the doctrine as a remedy for past

166 Id.
167 Id. at 1375–76. Primus notes that if the general reading of Ricci prevails, recognition of
a compelling evidentiary interest is the disparate impact doctrine’s only chance for survival. Id.
168 See Marcus, supra note 104, at 3 (arguing that Title VII must be narrowed to exclude
disparate impact or must be struck down as unconstitutional).
169 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 520–21. Under the “evidentiary dragnet” view
of disparate impact, Title VII and Title VIII are mainly concerned with punishing instances of
present, intentional discrimination. In contrast, proponents who view disparate impact as a
means of remedying past discrimination argue that the doctrine is equally, if not more,
concerned with breaking down the racial hierarchies that have resulted from past discrimination.
Id.
170 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1375–76.
171 See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(“[A]n amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot
justify the use of an unyielding racial quota.”).
172 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1377.
173 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 499.
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discrimination,174 finds support in a number of sources, including the
Supreme Court’s original disparate impact decision.175 In Griggs, the
defendant employer had a history of openly discriminating on the
basis of race, only permitting black employees to work in the Labor
Department, which paid the lowest out of all five departments within
the company.176 Following Congress’s passage of the 1964 Act,
however, the employer eliminated this overtly discriminatory
practice, and instead adopted a policy of requiring a high school
education for applicants seeking promotion from the Labor
department.177 The company also instituted a policy requiring that
initial applicants and candidates for promotion obtain a minimum
score on an achievement test. While facially neutral, the Court struck
down these policies, noting that they effectively carried out the
employer’s previous discriminatory policy; neutrality was simply a
guise.178
The facts of Griggs suggest that the Supreme Court first
recognized disparate impact doctrine in an effort to impose liability
where the discriminatory acts were almost certainly intentional, but
where such intent was impossible to prove. Griggs also shows that
given the difficulties of proving discriminatory intent, disparate
impact doctrine is necessary as a means of uncovering and imposing
liability for discriminatory motives,179 particularly where defendants
use practices that appear facially neutral in order to achieve a
discriminatory goal.180 During the early developments of
antidiscrimination law, “prohibitions against [only] intentional
discrimination could not address the more subtle forms of

174 See Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1378 (explaining that the evidentiary dragnet
view is only a temporary solution to challenges against disparate treatment claims).
175 Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
176 Id. at 427 (noting that the highest paying jobs in the Labor Department paid less than
the lowest paying jobs in the other four departments, where only whites were permitted to
work).
177 Id. The company also had an existing policy which required a high school education for
initial assignment to any department other than Labor. Id.
178 Id.
179 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 519. As Primus observes, this view of disparate
impact parallels the constitutional principle that strict scrutiny review serves as a means of
“smok[ing] out” the legislature’s true intent in taking measures that create racial classifications.
Id. at 520 n.113 (citing City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality
opinion)).
180 See Elliot M. Mincberg, Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title
VIII Litigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 128, 151 (1976) (noting that “only the careless
landlord or employer who wishes to discriminate will leave clues” as to their true motive); see
also United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974) (“[C]lever men
may easily conceal their [discriminatory] motivations.”).
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discrimination that grew up in their place.”181 The fact that courts
today rarely grant relief against a defendant without a suspicion of
discriminatory intent further supports the conclusion that intentional
discrimination is indeed the real focus of disparate impact,182 and that
a proper formulation of the doctrine under Title VIII should reflect
that concern.
C. Narrow Tailoring: Searching for a Perfect Fit
Assuming that disparate impact serves a compelling government
interest in detecting and deterring intentional discrimination,
questions still remain over whether the racial classifications embodied
within the doctrine183 can be “narrowly tailored” to serve that interest.
In the context of racial classifications, narrow tailoring requires “the
most exact connection” between the race-conscious measures and the
compelling government interest.184 Moreover, a statute cannot be
over- or underinclusive in terms of the conduct it reaches, and the
existence of nondiscriminatory alternatives seriously undercuts its
legitimacy.185 This section will illustrate how a balancing test
formulation of disparate impact can cause the doctrine to be both
overinclusive—imposing liability where it may be undue under the
evidentiary dragnet view of disparate impact—as well as
underinclusive—often failing to reach conduct that should raise a
presumption of discriminatory intent.
Further, this section will illustrate the main thesis of this Note: if
disparate impact must survive strict scrutiny in order to withstand the
constitutional conflict presented by a general reading of Ricci, then a
burden-shifting analysis is the most appropriate formulation of
disparate impact. The burden-shifting test, including the timing and
weight of the evidentiary burdens it places on both plaintiff and
defendant, is crucial to ensuring that Title VIII’s disparate impact
provisions are narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest in
“smoking out” intentional discrimination. For the purposes of
maintaining cohesion between disparate impact under Title VIII and
181 Rutherglen,

Equality, supra note 33, at 2328.
Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 520 (“The fact that an adjudicating court
does not enter a finding of intentional discrimination does not eliminate the possibility that
intent is the doctrine’s real concern . . . .”).
183 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing disparate impact as a racial classification).
184 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing
racial classifications as “too pernicious” to permit anything less than this close connection).
185 See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(noting that in order to be narrowly tailored, a racial classification cannot be overly restrictive).
182 See
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the principles of equal protection, a burden-shifting analysis is
preferable to the balancing test, as it may reduce the pressure on
housing providers to take race-conscious measures in order to avoid
disparate impact liability. Moreover, the burden-shifting test’s high
evidentiary standards will better enable courts to determine the true
motives behind a defendant’s actions, and to impose liability only
when a discriminatory motive is indicated.
1. Problems with the Balancing Test
Despite the merits of the balancing test for disparate impact,186 its
continued application in Title VIII cases may prevent disparate
impact doctrine from satisfying the “narrowly tailored” requirement
of strict scrutiny. For instance, because the balancing test “attempt[s]
to encapsulate in four simple questions all of the factors that should
influence the outcome of a Title VIII case,” it often fails to capture
the strength or importance of each party’s interest.187 For instance,
while the third factor is said to measure the “defendant’s interest in
the action,” it considers only the nature (legitimate or illegitimate) of
a defendant’s interest, while ignoring the strength of that interest.188
This factor also favors government over private interests, making it
difficult for defendants—particularly private entities—to defend
themselves, even when strong interests are involved. As a result,
defendants with a strong legitimate interest in taking some action may
have little hope of defending a successful prima facie case, which
may in turn increase defendants’ motivation to adopt the type of
“prophylactic measures” which gave rise to the controversy in Ricci.
An additional problem with the balancing test is its treatment of
the remedy a plaintiff seeks as relevant to the merits of a claim. Under
the fourth factor articulated in Arlington Heights I, courts must
consider whether the plaintiff is seeking to compel the defendant to
affirmatively provide housing or simply to remove obstacles to access
existing housing.189 This focus on the remedy is an “improper
consideration[] in the disparate impact context,”190 where the harm
inflicted (lack of access to housing) is the same, regardless of the
186 See

supra Part II.
supra note 64, at 410.
188 Id. at 411.
189 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights I), 429 U.S.
252 (1977). This factor weighs against plaintiffs who seek to compel defendants to affirmatively
provide housing.
190 Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. McGlothin 885 N.E.2d 1274,
1282 (Ind. 2008).
187 Stick,
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remedy being sought. Moreover, because the fourth factor favors
cases brought by private developers who seek to construct housing
over those brought by prospective residents of such housing, the
majority of successful cases against government defendants involve
challenges to zoning ordinances that produce a discriminatory
effect.191 The significance of this phenomenon lies in the fact that
unlike many situations that arise in the employment context, many
defendants in the housing context may have limited ability to grant
meaningful relief.192 For instance, even where relief is granted against
a municipality whose zoning ordinance produces a discriminatory
effect, minorities may still be excluded from housing in a given area,
because private sellers and landlords retain the ultimate power to
grant or deny access to housing. By favoring cases where judicially
granted remedies may have little practical effect on disadvantaged
groups, racial inequalities in housing may continue despite a court’s
imposition of liability under the balancing test standard.193 By causing
a disconnect between the harm inflicted and the implementation of an
appropriate remedy in this manner, a balancing-test version of
disparate impact under Title VIII may prevent the doctrine from
efficiently serving any compelling governmental interest.
Finally, a number of developments have taken place in the housing
market since the Arlington Heights II and Huntington decisions,
creating a possibility that the balancing test no longer reflects the
realities of the housing market.194 If this is the case, it may skew a
court’s estimate of a practice’s impact on minority groups. For
instance, courts applying the balancing test must evaluate the effects
of a defendants’ practice by measuring what proportion of a given
group will be adversely affected by that practice. In making this
determination, courts often focus on income level as a proxy for an
individual’s ability to access housing. In this respect, the balancing
test assumes that if housing is made available to all persons of a given
income level, it will be allocated randomly among those people,
regardless of race.195 However, in recent decades, family wealth has
become an increasingly prevalent factor in the homeownership
market, and the importance of credit checks has risen significantly in
191 Gordon,

supra note 161, at 451–52.
(noting that defendant employers often have direct authority to implement a remedy,
such as using a different test or different employment criteria).
193 Id. at 439 (“[E]ven once a remedy is formulated in a Title VIII case, the actual
achievement of racial desegregation often remains in question.”).
194 Id. at 448.
195 Id.
192 Id.
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both the rental and homeownership markets.196 Studies have shown,
however, that members of minority groups tend to have lower credit
scores than whites, and are less likely to receive financial assistance
from family members when purchasing a home.197 Therefore, because
a test that focuses on income alone will fail to measure the relative
disadvantage that members of minority groups will face in accessing
suitable housing, courts are likely to underestimate the
disproportionate impact of a given housing practice on minority
applicants.198 This creates a risk that courts will dismiss cases where
the impact of a defendant's conduct—if properly measured—would
raise a presumption of intentional discrimination. In such instances,
disparate impact doctrine and the racial classifications it creates will
fail to achieve the desired remedy of uncovering intentional
discrimination, and therefore will not meet strict scrutiny’s narrow
tailoring requirement.
2. The Burden-Shifting Test and Evidentiary Standards
As discussed in Part II, one of the main sources of conflict
between disparate impact and equal protection is the possibility that
employers and housing providers will adopt race-conscious quota
systems and other “prophylactic” measures in order to avoid disparate
liability.199 To make matters worse, a formulation of disparate impact
that fails to capture the defendants’ interests (i.e., the balancing test)
increases the likelihood that courts will impose liability on
undeserving defendants.200 With little chance of defending their
actions under a system which fails to appreciate their interests,
potential defendants will be pressured to take race-conscious
measures, such as throwing out valid employment tests,201 to avoid
the possibility that a plaintiff could bring a disparate impact claim in
the first place. However, as Justice O’Connor suggested nearly 20
years ago, evidentiary mechanisms, including the prima facie case
and proper allocations with respect to burdens of proof, may

196 Id. (citing John J. Ammann, Housing Out the Poor, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 309,
316–18 (2000)).
197 Id. at 450–51.
198 See id. at 449 (“[T[he income-centered analyses . . . likely overstate the number of
blacks who will receive housing . . . .”).
199 See supra Part II.
200 See supra Part III.C.1.
201 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
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significantly reduce this “pressure . . . to adopt inappropriate
prophylactic measures.”202
Therefore, to the extent that the conflict between disparate impact
and equal protection parallels the degree to which it encourages such
measures, courts may be able to reduce one of the greatest points of
conflict between disparate impact and equal protection by adhering to
a test that employs these mechanisms. Because the burden-shifting
analysis satisfies this need, courts addressing Title VIII claims would
be well advised to adopt it as the proper test for the following reasons.
First, by requiring plaintiffs to make out a full prima facie case
before imposing any burden on the defendant, the burden-shifting
standard reduces the pressure on defendants to adopt prophylactic
measures as a means of avoiding disparate impact liability. While the
balancing test operates less sequentially, requiring the defendant to
incur costs from the beginning, the burden-shifting analysis ensures
that the defendant will not incur significant litigation costs until after
the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. Therefore, in cases
where a plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case, the suit will be
dismissed without any showing required from the defendant. By
conditioning the defendant’s burden on the plaintiff’s initial success
in this manner, the burden-shifting analysis should give defendants a
greater sense of security against the threat and costs associated with
defending frivolous claims. This security may in turn reduce the
pressure on housing providers to adopt quota systems or other raceconscious measures, thereby minimizing a major source of conflict
between equal protection and disparate impact.
Further, unlike the balancing test, which often fails to capture the
strength of a defendant’s interest, the burden-shifting analysis gives
potential defendants the opportunity to fully explain their actions,
including the strength of their interests and the decision-making
process they employed.203 This opportunity, combined with the
possibility that a plaintiff’s case will fail before the defendant incurs
any litigation costs, is more likely to assure would-be defendants that
prophylactic measures are unnecessary to avoid disparate impact
liability.204 In that respect, adoption of the burden-shifting standard in
Title VIII cases may also deter housing providers from taking action
202 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (opinion of O’Connor,
J.) (plurality opinion).
203 Mincberg, supra note 180, at 157–58.
204 Of course, despite the opportunity to better defend their actions, such defendants will
still incur the litigation costs, unless such costs can be allocated to a third party. See infra Part
IV.D. for further discussion on this possibility.
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that would otherwise violate equal protection, keeping the doctrine in
line with constitutional principles.
Finally, the burden-shifting approach to business necessity is
preferable to the situation that often results under a balancing test—
imposing on the plaintiff the burden and guesswork of anticipating
and rejecting the possible justifications the defendant may have had.
In addition to the burdens imposed on the plaintiff, courts applying
the balancing approach may only infer the defendant’s thought
process, rather than hearing it from the defendant directly.205 By
instead placing the burden on the defendants to articulate the reasons
and logic for their conduct, the burden-shifting standard allows courts
to “as fairly and effectively as possible” discover “the method by
which such discriminatory effects were produced, the reason that
particular method was chosen by the defendant, and the legitimacy of
such reasons themselves.”206 In this respect, the burden-shifting test
increases the likelihood that the defendant will “produce his full
story,”207 giving courts a better understanding of the reasons
(intentional or unintentional) behind practices with discriminatory
effects. In serving this function, the burden-shifting analysis may
more efficiently achieve the government’s interest in rooting out
intentional discrimination,208 providing courts with a better indication
of whether there is “something untoward about the defendant’s
motivations.”209 The burden-shifting test may therefore increase the
chance that courts will only impose liability when it is well-deserved
under the “evidentiary dragnet” view of disparate impact, thus
striking “[t]he correct balance between over- and underenforcement.”210
IV. ADAPTING THE BURDEN-SHIFTING STANDARD TO TITLE VIII
While a burden-shifting analysis may help to align disparate
impact doctrine with the goals it was designed to promote, the
balance between over- and underenforcement “cannot be struck in the
abstract,” achievement of that balance will depend on “a pragmatic
205 See Mincberg, supra note 180, at 157–58 (“[T]he employer or landlord can more easily
isolate from among the many possible justifications the interests furthered by the allegedly
discriminatory practice.”).
206 Id. at 157.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 157–58 (citing CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 338, 343 (E. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972)).
209 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1378 (citing Selmi, supra note 2, at 716, 749).
210 Rutherglen, Equality, supra note 33, at 2337.
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assessment of what can be expected to work in different
[contexts].”211 Although Title VII’s burden-shifting test provides the
proper framework for evaluating Title VIII disparate impact claims,
the inherent differences between the housing and employment
contexts suggest that the analogy may be less than perfect with
respect to the “business necessity” prong of the burden-shifting
test.212 As defendant employers are increasingly receiving greater
deference from the courts, the limitations of the analogy between
Title VII and Title VIII have become increasingly important.213 This
Part will explore the inherent differences between housing and
employment, and will discuss how these differences warrant several
important variations on the burden-shifting test when it is applied in
the Title VIII context.
Specifically, this Part will propose that given the limited number
of relevant considerations in decisions involving allocation of
housing, Title VIII defendants should bear a higher burden than their
Title VII counterparts when seeking to justify practices that produce a
discriminatory result. In light of the unique and often remedial role of
government entities in the housing context, this Part will demonstrate
that a “compelling business necessity” standard is appropriate for
government actions that produce a discriminatory effect. While these
variations on the burden-shifting test do not necessarily impact
whether or not the disparate impact doctrine satisfies the “narrow
tailoring” requirement of strict scrutiny, they are meant to better
reflect the congressional purposes behind Title VIII.214
A. Business Necessity: Current Applications
Like much of antidiscrimination law, the concept of “business
necessity” has proven to be a source of confusion for courts in both
employment and housing discrimination cases. When the Supreme
Court first recognized the business necessity defense in the
employment context, the Court declared that a job requirement that
has a discriminatory effect may only survive if it has a “manifest
relationship” to the employment in question, and fulfills a “genuine
211 Id.
212 See id. at 2314 (noting that context is a crucial factor in determining the weight and
terms of a defendant’s burden).
213 See Christopher P. McCormack, Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing an
Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563,
565–66 (1986) (“For Title VIII, the limits of the analogy with Title VII are becoming more
important as employers’ discretion receives greater deference in Title VII doctrine.”).
214 See infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing congressional intent).
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business need.”215 Other courts have adopted similar recitations of
this test, including whether the practice is “necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business.”216
Regardless of the specific phrasing used, most courts consider
three main factors in evaluating a business necessity defense:
(1) whether the practice relates to a valid business purpose that is
sufficient to override any discriminatory effects; (2) whether the
practice effectively serves business operations; and (3) whether the
defendant has no alternative means of achieving its business goal.217
Most courts agree that a defendant cannot fulfill the burden by simply
supplying evidence of job-relatedness,218 but instead must present (at
the very least) “convincing facts establishing a fit between the
qualification and the job.”219 Thus, courts tend to construe the defense
narrowly, often requiring a defendant to show that “dire economic
consequences” will result from changing a practice that produces
disparate impact.220
In the housing context, courts applying the burden-shifting
analysis have also taken a variety of approaches to the nature of a
defendant’s burden of justification, drawing mainly from these Title
VII principles. In United States v. City of Black Jack,221 the Eighth
Circuit imposed a heavy burden on a local government to justify a
city zoning ordinance which prohibited construction of any new
multi-family homes.222 In order to justify the ordinance, which it
found to have a racially discriminatory effect, the court held the city
to a strict scrutiny standard similar to the test employed under equal
protection jurisprudence, requiring that a practice be “necessary” to
serve a “compelling governmental interest.”223 Despite the City’s
assertions of several interests (including traffic safety, prevention of
school overcrowding, and the need to prevent devaluation of single
family homes), the court refused to recognize any of these interests as
sufficiently compelling, and struck down the ordinance as a violation
of Title VIII.224
215 Griggs

v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971).
217 Mincberg, supra note 180, at 175–76.
218 Id. at 176.
219 See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732 (1st Cir. 1972).
220 McCormack, supra note 213, at 570.
221 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding that the city could not justify its practices under
the business necessity standard where the practice served no compelling government interest).
222 Id. at 1181–82.
223 Id. at 1185.
224 Id. at 1187.
216 Robinson
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In contrast to the Eighth Circuit’s stringent approach, other courts
have granted slightly more deference to Title VIII defendants,
requiring only that a contested practice serve a “legitimate, bona fide
interest,” and “that no alternative course of action could be adopted
that would enable that interest to be served with less discriminatory
impact.”225 In Rizzo, the Third Circuit also specifically noted how the
differences between housing and employment might affect disparate
impact analysis.226 As the court observed, the “the job-related
qualities which might legitimately bar a Title VII-protected employee
from employment will be much more susceptible to definition and
quantification than any attempted justification of discriminatory
housing practices under Title VIII.”227 While this observation may
seem to suggest that business necessity is more easily proven in the
employment context, the court did not go so far as to indicate that a
lower business necessity standard would be appropriate in housing
cases. Rather, as the following section will illustrate, the differences
between housing and employment suggest that given the limited
number of legitimate justifications for denying housing to a qualified
applicant, Title VIII defendants should bear a higher burden than their
Title VII counterparts when seeking to rebut a prima facie case of
disparate impact.
B. Raising the Bar for Title VIII Defendants
In order to fully examine the reasons in favor of imposing a higher
burden on Title VIII defendants, it is necessary to explore the types of
justifications defendants commonly offer in both Title VII and Title
VIII cases, especially those justifications based on applicant
characteristics and the financial burdens of changing a practice that
produces a discriminatory effect.228 This section will explore how, in
light of these justifications and the inherent differences between the
housing and employment contexts, defendants in Title VIII cases
should bear a greater burden than Title VII defendants when
justifying practices that produce a discriminatory effect.229 Where the
justification is based on applicant characteristics, there are fewer
225 Resident

Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977).
supra note 6, at 436.
227 Rizzo, 464 F.3d at 148.
228 See Mincberg, supra note 180, at 177 (“[These justifications] may include such
subjective criteria as the absence of fellow employee or neighbor recommendations, or more
objective standards such as an applicant’s prior arrest record or past wage garnishment.”).
229 See McCormack, supra note 213, at 565 (“[F]ewer business considerations will suffice
to support the defense of business necessity in housing than in employment”).
226 Mahoney,
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relevant characteristics in the housing context, most of which are
objective in nature. Where the justification is based on financial
burden, the potential losses to private defendants are generally
speculative at best, and government defendants have little room to
argue that financial concerns trump more humanitarian objectives.230
1. Justifications Based on Applicant Characteristics
Defendants in both housing and employment contexts often seek to
justify their actions based on applicant characteristics, which may
range from subjective (i.e., neighbor or employee recommendations)
to objective (i.e., past criminal records, history of wage garnishment)
in nature.231 For the most part, courts have held that these
justifications are valid only to the extent that they reflect an
applicant’s ability to perform legitimate employee or tenant/purchaser
obligations.232 In the employment context, such obligations generally
include the ability to perform a job safely and efficiently. Similarly,
housing obligations generally include the ability to pay either rent or a
purchase amount, and to maintain facilities in the case of a rental.
Therefore, characteristics such as criminal records or neighbor
recommendations should not serve as legitimate justifications, unless
they help to identify characteristics related to these obligations.233
Of course, the differing nature of the relationships formed in the
housing and employment contexts suggest that there is less room for a
Title VIII defendant to justify a particular practice based on applicant
characteristics. As a noted scholar in the field of housing
discrimination has observed, employee-employer relationships are
necessarily ongoing in nature.234 Because these relationships often
require an employee to have specific knowledge and experience
related to the employer’s line of work and method of doing business,
employers must often consider a wide array factors that relate to
effective job performance, from obvious qualifications like education
and training, to more subtle requirements such as height and weight,
which may relate to productivity in certain contexts.235 In short, an
230 See United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 119 (5th Cir. 1973)
(arguing that financial concerns should yield to more compassionate objectives in the housing
context).
231 See Mincberg, supra note 180, at 177–78.
232 Id. (noting that requirements should be limited to essential obligations such as the
ability to pay rent or maintain the property).
233 Id., at 178.
234 Schwemm, supra note 43, at 235.
235 Mincberg, supra note 180, at 177–78; see also McCormack, supra note 213, at 567
(observing that in the housing context, “fine points of skill, education and the like are not
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“employer has broad areas of legitimate concern; a decision to hire
creates a relationship in which highly diverse considerations of safety,
efficiency, and the worker’s skill can be important.”236 In such cases,
courts may be ill equipped to evaluate the legitimacy of the
employer’s unique and specialized considerations, and may be less
willing to interfere with business efficiency and productivity.237
In contrast, the concerns faced by housing providers tend to be
more limited in scope and more objective in nature.238 While certain
housing transactions, such as the rental of an apartment, create an
ongoing relationship between the landlord and tenant, others, such as
the sale of a home, end at the point of closing. In these situations,
very few factors are relevant in terms of what constitutes a
“desirable” renter or buyer, as a seller or lessor’s main consideration
is the applicant’s ability to pay the desired price.239 Because this
consideration is an easily quantifiable “applicant characteristic,”
courts are better equipped to evaluate the legitimacy of a landlord’s or
seller’s practices, and may be less willing to defer to a defendant’s
decision-making discretion.240 Indeed, the consequences of selecting
an unqualified candidate are likely to be more severe in an
employment context,241 suggesting that judicial deference to the
defendant's judgment is less warranted in the housing context.242
2. Justifications Based on Financial Burden
In addition to applicant characteristics, defendants in disparate
impact cases often seek to justify their practices on the ground that
changing those practices will impose financial burdens on the
defendants’ business operations.243 For instance, employers may point
to the costs of developing new aptitude tests that do not produce

critical, if important at all”).
236 McCormack, supra note 213, at 566.
237 See id. (noting that while Title VII contains several exemptions which reflect
Congress’s intent to minimize interference with an employer’s business operations, Title VIII
contains no such exceptions).
238 Id.
239 Id. at 566–67. Of course, in a rental situation, the lessor may also be concerned with
other factors, such as the potential renter’s ability to maintain the premises.
240 Id.
at 565–66. McCormack also notes that “[t]he concept of business
necessity . . . cannot raise many issues of legitimate concern” for housing providers. Id. at 602.
241 Schwemm, supra note 43, at 235 (quoting Mincberg, supra note 180, at 174).
242 Mincberg, supra note 180, at 174 (“Indeed, in housing, the consequences of an error in
admitting a tenant do not seem nearly as severe as, for example, the consequences of an error in
hiring an unqualified airline pilot.”).
243 Id. at 178.
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discriminatory results, or to the costs associated with training
employees who do not have the skills or knowledge that were
previously required under a policy that produced discriminatory
effects. While the magnitude of these burdens may be subject to
debate, one thing is certain: the costs associated with changing a
business practice are almost certain to accrue once relief is granted
against an employer.
Housing providers may also argue that changing a business
practice will would create a financial burden to the landlord, such that
maintenance of the practice serves a “business necessity.”244 To
illustrate, many private landlords use a potential tenant’s credit score
as a selection criteria designed to measure the tenant’s risk of
default.245 Because minority applicants statistically have lower credit
scores than white applicants, such practices may produce a
discriminatory effect.246 While a landlord may seek to justify this
practice on the ground that changing the policy would expose her to a
greater risk of renter default, such a financial burden (assuming it
materializes at all) is far less immediate than those which are likely to
result from changing an employment practice.247 As a result, courts
are less likely to sympathize with the housing provider who asserts
such a defense, thus increasing the burden on Title VIII defendants.
Additionally, in the context of government-subsidized housing,
where potential defendants often play a remedial role,248 justifications
based on financial burdens are even less persuasive. While financial
concerns are of great importance to private and governmental
employers alike, government housing providers and regulators will
find it difficult to justify their practices based on financial concerns
alone.249 Unlike governmental employers, government regulators and
244 See e.g., Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that a landlord
who required potential tenants to have a weekly income equal to 90% of the monthly rent, or
have a third party guarantee rent payments was permissible), called into question by Huntington
Branch, NAACP. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[E]ven if the
views expressed in Lefrak still apply in a Title VIII case against a private defendant, a matter of
considerable uncertainty, the disparate impact approach of Title VII cases is fully applicable to
this Title VIII case brought against a public defendant.”).
245 See Gordon, supra note 161, at 448–49 (“In both the rental and homeownership
markets, credit checks play a major role in housing allocation.”).
246 See id. (discussing data demonstrating the lesser credit scores of minorities compared to
those of whites and the resultant disadvantage posed in obtaining housing).
247 Unlike the definite costs associated with changing an employment practice, the
possibility of renter default is only a risk, and not certain to impose a burden on the housing
provider.
248 See infra Part IV.C.2 for a further discussion of government entities’ remedial roles in
the housing context.
249 See infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the inadequacy of “cost-minimization” as a legitimate
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housing providers do not have the same money-making interests as a
private entity, and are even less justified in citing financial burdens as
legitimate concerns.250
C. How Heavy a Burden?
Having established that Title VIII defendants should bear a heavier
burden in justifying practices that produce discriminatory effects, the
question thus becomes how heavy a burden to impose, and whether
that burden should be applied uniformly to both government and
private defendants.
1. Private Defendants and “Intermediate Scrutiny”
In discussing the appropriate burden to place upon Title VIII
defendants, one commentator has suggested that an “intermediate
standard” of review “similar to equal protection intermediate
scrutiny” may be the most appropriate form of analysis, particularly
for private defendants.251 While a more lenient standard—particularly
one that would justify a discriminatory effect whenever a “legitimate”
goal was at stake—would defeat the Congressional goals behind Title
VIII altogether,252 a stricter standard would create an insurmountable
obstacle for private defendants seeking to justify their practices.253
Therefore, in light of the difficulties associated with these more
“extreme” versions of a business necessity test, “[s]ome form of
intermediate standard of review is necessary.”254
Adoption of an intermediate standard also follows logically from
the idea that the “business necessity” analysis commonly employed in
Title VII cases mirrors the “rational basis” review employed in equal
protection cases.255 Thus, if Title VIII defendants are to bear a higher

interest in the housing context).
250 See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the unique role of government entities in the housing
context).
251 See Stick, supra note 64, at 428–29 & n.146 (noting that the choice of a proper test for
Title VIII claims is between the balancing test and an “intermediate absolute test”). Stick uses
the term “absolute standard” as a catch-all for the various forms of the burden-shifting analysis
that courts have applied in disparate impact cases. See id. at 408, 417.
252 Id. at 426–27 (“Congress intended housing practices with discriminatory effects to be
permitted only if strongly justified.”).
253 See id. at 425–26 (noting that absent a compelling interest, “almost every [private]
action that produces a discriminatory effect would be found to be a violation of Title VIII”).
254 Id. at 428.
255 See id. at 426 (noting that cost minimization often satisfies Title VII’s “legitimate goal”
requirement).
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burden than their Title VII counterparts, then application of the next
highest level of scrutiny should be warranted for practices that
produce discriminatory effects in housing.256 Under the “intermediate
scrutiny” analysis, Title VIII defendants should be required to show
that any practice producing a discriminatory effect serves an
“important interest,” and that no alternative practices exist.257
The question then arises: what, if any, interests could be
sufficiently “important” to justify housing practices that produce a
discriminatory effect? In Title VII cases, employers often successfully
defend their practices on the basis that alternative measures would not
serve the employer’s cost-minimization objectives as effectively as
current practices.258 The legislative history of Title VIII, however,
suggests that “[i]f a practice with discriminatory effects could be
justified whenever it costs less than the alternatives, [Title VIII]
would be meaningless.”259 Because Congress’s goal in enacting Title
VIII was to achieve “‘truly integrated and balanced living
patterns,’”260 Title VIII was intended to combat more than discrete
acts of discrimination in actual sales or rentals of housing, and was
“seen as an attempt to alter the whole character of the housing
market.”261 In light of these ambitious goals—which arguably go
further than Congress’s goals in enacting Title VII262—it would be
difficult to argue that Congress intended for a housing provider’s
interests in “cost minimization” to outweigh the importance Congress
placed on integrated housing patterns.
256 In equal protection jurisprudence, intermediate scrutiny serves as the “middle ground”
between rational basis and strict scrutiny review. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210–
11 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing that the Court’s gender discrimination
analysis “will be viewed by some as a ‘middle-tier’ approach”).
257 See Stick, supra note 64, at 429 (observing that the “no alternative” requirement mirrors
the “substantial relationship” between means and ends required under an equal protection
analysis).
258 In practice, courts often accept mere “cost minimization” as a legitimate interest for
Title VII defendants. See id. at 426 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971)). The legislative history of Title VIII suggests, however, that such an interest should be
insufficient to justify discriminatory effects in the housing context. Id.
259 Id.
260 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114 CONG. REC.
3422 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale)).
261 Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (Wilkey, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
262 The purpose of Title VII “‘is to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications, rather
than on the basis of race or color.’” Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7247
(1964)). This language, when compared to the stated goals behind Title VIII, suggests that while
Congress intended for Title VIII to accomplish a complete and perhaps long-term overhaul of
the housing situation in the United States, its goals in enacting Title VII focused more on the
immediate effects of adverse employment actions.
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Therefore, under a business necessity test that tracks intermediate
scrutiny analysis, Title VIII defendants should be required to show
that a practice serves an interest greater than merely “cost
minimization.”263 The question then arises: what other “interests” may
be important enough to justify private housing practices that produce
discriminatory effects? The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Mountain Side
Mobile Estates Partnership v. Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development264 may offer some guidance on this issue. In Mountain
Side, the court held that a mobile home park owner’s interests in
avoiding problems associated with exceeding the sewer system’s
capacity limitations and preserving the quality of life within the park,
were sufficiently important to justify the defendant’s practice of
limiting mobile home occupancy to three residents per home.265
Crucial to the Tenth Circuit’s ruling was its determination that the
occupancy limit had “a manifest relationship to the housing in
question.”266 Mountain Side therefore suggests that in order for an
interest to be deemed “important” for purposes of business necessity
analysis, it must relate to the nature of the housing at issue, and must
affect the private defendant’s ability to effectively provide such
housing.267 However, because the level of relatedness between a
practice and the housing at issue is likely to be highly contextual,
courts should conduct this inquiry on a case-by-case basis. While
courts should keep a careful eye out for instances of intentional

263 See Stick, supra note 64, at 426 (observing that the effect of a weak standard of review
in Title VIII cases is an ability of defendants to present cost minimization as a legitimate goal).
An exception to this rule should be made in cases where a defendant would suffer “dire
economic consequences” if forced to change his practices. See McCormack, supra note 213, at
570 (discussing the rigorous standard the courts have applied to determine whether business
necessity is a sufficient defense to overcome disparate impact). While avoidance of such
hardship would understandably qualify as an important interest—particularly where the
hardship could lead to the downfall of the defendant’s entire business—a defendant’s interest in
raising his income marginally should be outweighed by a plaintiff’s interests in fair housing.
264 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995). While at first glance the Tenth Circuit appears to apply
the Arlington Heights II balancing test, the court in fact conducts a burden-shifting analysis in
determining that the defendant’s showing of “business necessity” successfully rebutted the
plaintiff’s prima facie case. Id. at 1253.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 1254. As the court noted, an “insubstantial justification in this regard will not
suffice, because such a low standard would permit discrimination to be practiced through the
use of spurious, seemingly neutral practices.” Id.
267 Under this analysis, practices related to financial concerns could still arguably qualify
as “important.” For instance, a private homeowner’s association that requires monthly
homeowner’s fees could potentially justify its practice, despite any discriminatory effects it
produces, on the basis that fees are essential to the association’s ability to provide the type of
living conditions that residents seek and expect in that type of housing, thus creating a
relationship between the practice and the housing at issue.
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discrimination masquerading as a legitimate practice, their application
of the burden-shifting standard should alleviate this concern.268
2. Government Defendants and “Compelling Business Necessity”
While courts generally apply Title VII’s business necessity
standard uniformly to both public and private defendants, courts
addressing Title VIII claims have recognized the unique role of
government entities in the housing context, and have developed
different business necessity standards for public and private
entities.269 Although government and private employers perform
virtually identical roles, the roles of government and private entities
differ significantly in the housing context. As a result, many of the
roles served by government entities in the housing context have no
parallel in the context of employment.270
In the housing context, government entities often regulate third
parties through zoning ordinances and permit policies. In this respect,
a potential defendant functions solely as a government entity by
performing a duty for which private entities have no authority.
However, government entities may also engage in housing-related
activities that parallel those of a private entity, including
administration of low-income housing programs.271 However, in light
of the remedial nature of these activities, government defendants in
the housing context do not have the same moneymaking interest as
private landlords or developers. Government housing providers also
differ from government employers in this respect, as government
employers have a valid interest in generating revenue.272 Because
“success” of an operation is not as easily quantifiable where money is
not a consideration, government defendants in housing cases should

268 See

supra Part III.C.2.
e.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 988 n.5 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting
that different standards should apply based on whether the defendant is a government or private
entity). See also McCormack, supra note 213, at 602 (noting that there is no consensus on the
appropriate standard for a government defendant seeking to rebut a plaintiff’s prima facie case).
270 McCormack, supra note 213, at 601–02.
271 See id. (analogizing government housing providers to private landlords).
272 This financial interest is implied by courts’ willingness to recognize a “business
necessity” defense in Title VII cases against government defendants. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (recognizing the business necessity standard); see also
McCormack, supra note 213, at 601–02 & n.273 (recognizing courts’ use of the business
necessity defense in Title VII cases against public and private defendants and discussing the
stronger merits of the defense when used by public entities in Title VII cases than in Title VIII
cases).
269 See,
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bear a heavier burden than their private counterparts in proving that a
given practice is “necessary” to the achievement of their objectives.273
For this reason, most courts addressing Title VIII disparate impact
claims have imposed a higher burden on government entities than on
private defendants to justify actions that produce a discriminatory
effect.274 This trend and the logic behind it suggest that in Title VIII
cases involving government defendants, the Eighth Circuit’s
heightened “compelling business necessity” may be a more
appropriate standard.
While the Third Circuit has rejected the “compelling business
necessity” standard as too stringent, even for government
defendants,275 the Supreme Court may not agree. In Trafficante,276 the
Court held that administrative interpretations of Title VIII by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the
administrative agency responsible for implementing and
administering Title VIII,277 are “entitled to great weight.”278 In the
administrative proceeding leading up to the Tenth Circuit’s decision
in Mountain Side, the Secretary of HUD interpreted Title VIII as
encompassing a “compelling business necessity” standard for
defendants seeking to justify their practices.279 While the Court’s
holding in Trafficante predated this interpretation, Trafficante
nonetheless suggests that the Supreme Court would give substantial
weight to HUD’s endorsement of a “compelling business necessity”
standard if confronted with the issue.280
273 McCormack, supra note 213, at 602 (citing Betsey, 736 F.2d 983; Resident Advisory
Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1974)).
274 McCormack, supra note 213, at 602–03 (citing Betsey, 736 F.2d 983; Rizzo, 564 F.2d
126; City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179).
275 See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148–49 (noting that because a “compelling interest” is not
required under Title VII, such a heavy burden should be reserved only for those defendants
seeking to justify purposeful discrimination).
276 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
277 See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (2006) (granting authority to enforce Title VIII to the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,
107 (1979) (describing HUD as “the federal agency primarily assigned to implement and
administer Title VIII”).
278 Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210 (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971)).
279 Mahoney, supra note 6, at 443–44.
280 While several circuit courts have rejected HUD’s compelling business necessity
standard, those cases involved the standard as applied to private defendants. Thus, even if the
Supreme Court finds such decisions informative, the possibility remains that HUD’s compelling
business necessity standard may be appropriate for government defendants. See Pfaff v. U.S.
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 748 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying a “reasonableness”
standard); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243,
1254 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Secretary in the administrative proceedings incorrectly

2/15/2011 6:16:48 PM

2011]

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND BEYOND

643

Interestingly, the City of Black Jack’s “compelling business
necessity” requirement closely parallels the “compelling state
interest” standard imposed in cases involving constitutional violations
that trigger strict scrutiny review.281 While strict scrutiny was once
thought to be “strict in theory, but fatal in fact,”282 subsequent
jurisprudential developments have disproven this notion,283 leaving
open the possibility that certain government interests may be
sufficiently compelling to justify facially neutral practices that
produce discriminatory effects.284 Moreover, as Judge Posner has
observed, it may be more constitutionally appropriate to impose a
higher burden on government entities than it is to require the same of
private parties.285 This may be attributed in part to the fact that
government defendants are more likely than their private counterparts
to successfully assert an interest sufficiently “compelling” to justify
practices that produce discriminatory effects.286 As one commentator
has suggested, financial objectives in the housing context should give

required the defendant to demonstrate a compelling necessity).
281 This inference is furthered by the Eighth Circuit’s explicit reliance on equal protection
jurisprudence in articulating its decision. See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d
1179, 1185 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1974). Application of this heightened standard would complete the
analogy between the statutory business necessity standard and equal protection scrutiny. As
discussed supra, business necessity for Title VII defendants resembles rational basis review; for
Title VIII private defendants, business necessity resembles intermediate scrutiny review. For the
reasons discussed in this section, it follows that business necessity for Title VIII government
defendants should resemble the highest level of scrutiny.
282 Stick, supra note 64, at 425 n.131 (citing Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1972)).
283 See supra Part III.B (discussing Grutter). While these developments have taken place in
the context of equal protection claims, the notion that certain measures may survive strict
scrutiny applies with equal force in the Title VIII context.
284 While equal protection strict scrutiny applies only to instances of intentional
discrimination or disparate treatment, the “compelling business necessity” standard proposed in
Black Jack applies to facially neutral practices that produce a disparate impact. While the
application is different, the level of scrutiny is essentially the same.
285 See Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1533 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (“It
is one thing to require a municipal government to consider the impact of its zoning decisions on
the racial composition of the municipality, another to require an individual broker to consider
and take steps to prevent [disparate impact].”).
286 Despite his protestations against a strict scrutiny standard for business necessity, Stick
implicitly recognizes that government defendants may have an easier time justifying
discriminatory effects. Although he states that “[e]ven governmental defendants rarely have
compelling interests at stake,” Stick, supra note 64, at 426 (emphasis added), this contrasts with
Stick’s view of private defendants’ likelihood of asserting a compelling interest, which appears
to be virtually zero. Id. at 425–26.
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way to more “humane and compassionate mores,”287 particularly
where the defendant is a government entity.288
D. “Multiple Actor” Problems and the Need for an
“Intervening Cause” Defense
The forgoing analysis may appear to create a significant hurdle for
Title VIII defendants—both private and public—particularly in light
of the “multiple actor” problem, which is unique to the housing
context.289 The multiple-actor concept recognizes that, in contrast to
discriminatory effects in the employment context, discriminatory
effects in the housing context are often the result of more than one
entity’s actions.290 While a defendant employer’s practices are often
directly responsible for the discriminatory effects alleged in Title VII
cases, Title VIII cases often involve multiple actors that play diverse
roles within the housing market. Because of this phenomenon, it is
often unclear which actor’s practices have produced the disparate
effect alleged.291 The implications may be even more serious when
the actor named as a defendant in a disparate impact case is not the
source of the problem.
For instance, private developers and sellers of real estate have little
control over the practices of other private entities such as mortgage
brokers and lending institutions. This means that private sellers who
require purchasers to obtain bank financing, for instance, could
potentially be held liable under disparate impact theory for the
discriminatory actions of a lender who chooses only to grant loans to
members of a certain group.292
This problem suggests that Title VIII defendants should be able to
defend against discriminatory effects for which they are not
responsible, or over which they have no control. In addition to
promoting general fairness, such a defense may be beneficial to
disparate impact doctrine in several ways, particularly if the doctrine
is to survive a constitutional challenge. First, recognition of an
affirmative defense based on intervening causes or factors may
further enable disparate impact doctrine to satisfy the narrow tailoring
287 United

States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 119 (5th Cir. 1973).
Mincberg, supra note 180, at 179 (applying the “more humane and compassionate
mores” argument to cases involving government entities).
289 See Gordon, supra note 161, at 451 (discussing the multiple actor dilemma).
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 See id. at 451–52 (discussing the greater ease with which developers and lenders can
defend alleged Title VIII violations than can municipal actors).
288 See
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requirement of strict scrutiny,293 as it will prevent courts from
imposing liability on innocent defendants. Instead, the intervening
cause defense may better enable courts to determine the true source of
discriminatory effects, and to investigate further if there are indicators
of discriminatory intent.
Second, recognition of an affirmative defense based on intervening
causes may further reduce the risk that housing providers will “adopt
prophylactic measures” in order to avoid disparate impact liability.294
While defendants pursuing such a defense will run the risk of
incurring litigation costs, these costs may be offset by an
indemnification claim for litigation costs against the third party. 295
This possibility for indemnification may further assure employers and
housing providers that race-conscious measures are unnecessary to
avoid disparate impact liability. By ceasing to promote race-conscious
conduct in this manner, recognition of an affirmative defense based
on intervening causes may further reduce a major source of conflict
between disparate impact and equal protection.
CONCLUSION
Disparate impact doctrine under Title VIII is fraught with
inconsistencies, particularly with respect to the appropriate test the
court should use. While part of the blame lies with the Supreme Court
for its dearth of guidance, even a proper ruling or a Congressional
amendment296 would leave open the debate regarding disparate
impact’s relationship to equal protection. As revealed in Ricci v. De
Stefano, disparate impact and the pressure it imposes on employers
and housing providers to avoid liability may very well conflict with
equal protection’s ban on racial classifications. Despite this apparent
contradiction, the two doctrines may still be reconciled, depending on
how future courts read Ricci and interpret disparate impact’s purpose.
293 See

supra Part II.C for further discussion of the narrow tailoring issue.
supra Part II.B.1 (discussing judicial concerns that disparate impact will encourage
adoption of prophylactic measures).
295 For instance, the private developer who requires home buyers to obtain bank financing
as a prerequisite to a sale could defend her practice in spite of any discriminatory effects by
showing that the bank’s practice of granting loans disproportionately to members of a minority
group was in fact the underlying cause of any discriminatory effects alleged. While the
developer would undoubtedly incur litigation expenses during this process, she could potentially
recoup those costs by seeking indemnification against the bank as a third party defendant. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a)(1) (“A defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and
complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.”).
296 Congress amended Title VII to explicitly include a disparate impact standard and the
burden-shifting framework. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006)).
294 See
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As Richard Primus suggests, disparate impact, when viewed as a tool
for rooting out discriminatory motives, may in fact serve a compelling
government interest in preventing overtly discriminatory acts.297 If
disparate impact doctrine is to survive strict scrutiny, however, it
must also be narrowly tailored to achieving that end. This requirement
is instructive with respect to the proper test to be applied in Title VIII
cases. Because disparate impact is more likely to directly serve the
government’s interest when framed as a burden-shifting analysis,
courts should abandon the Arlington Heights II balancing test in favor
of the Title VII framework.
While Title VII’s standards provide a useful guidepost for courts
addressing Title VIII claims, the differences between the housing and
employment contexts limit their applicability to Title VIII claims.
Because there are likely to be fewer valid justifications for practices
that produce discriminatory effects in the housing context,298 it is only
fair to subject Title VIII defendants to a higher standard of proof. This
proposition fits nicely with the idea that all racial classifications must
be subject to strict scrutiny; because very few (if any) differences
among racial groups will justify unequal treatment, a higher standard
of review should apply.299 Moreover, such a standard is undoubtedly
important if courts are to achieve a thorough understanding of the
defendant’s rationale, imposing liability only when a clear indication
of discriminatory intent is present. In this respect, application of a
higher standard will more directly serve the government’s interest in
rooting out intentional discrimination, increasing disparate impact’s
chances of surviving strict scrutiny.
It is important to note, of course, that there may very well be
solutions to the constitutional dilemma that do not subject disparate
impact to strict scrutiny at all.300 In that case, the absence of a narrow
tailoring requirement would eliminate a major justification for
abandoning the balancing test. Moreover, if the Court interprets Ricci
in a manner that differs from Primus’s “general reading” of the case,
the conflict between disparate impact and equal protection may be
less of a threat than some critics and members of the Court appear to
297 Primus,

Future, supra note 12, at 1377.
McCormack, supra note 213, at 565–66 (discussing the limitations of Title VII
justifications as applied to Title VIII defendants).
299 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (noting that race is “a
group classification long recognized as . . . irrelevant” and that it “should be subjected to
detailed judicial inquiry”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
300 See Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 501 (“Traditionally, the most
straightforward strategy for protecting disparate impact doctrine from a constitutional challenge
would be to avoid heightened scrutiny altogether.”).
298 See

2/15/2011 6:16:48 PM

2011]

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND BEYOND

647

believe.301 This is not to say that courts would be entirely justified in
continuing to apply the balancing test under Title VIII. As this Note
and other critics have observed, the balancing test is arguably flawed
in several ways, which may explain why lower courts have chosen to
reject it in favor of the Title VII framework. 302 Regardless, the
resolution of these questions will depend largely on the facts and
circumstances of future disparate impact cases. While one can only
speculate as to what the future will bring, any outcome regarding
disparate impact doctrine, its constitutionality, and its application in
Title VIII will be “highly salient for years to come.”303
LINDSEY E. SACHER†

301 Compare Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1382 (“Characterizing Title VII’s disparate
impact provisions as an evidentiary dragnet could save those provisions from wholesale
invalidation in a world where the courts adopted the general reading of Ricci.”), with id. at 1346
(“[D]isparate impact doctrine could survive the institutional reading or the visible-victims
reading, or a combination of the two.”).
302 See Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. McGlothin 885 N.E.2d
1274, 1282 (Ind. 2008) (noting that the balancing test “seems doctrinally unsound,” especially
in light of the language similarities between Title VII and Title VIII).
303 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1387.
† J.D. Candidate, 2011, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.

